

Series I
Correspondence,
1932-1973

Box 7, Folder 6

January 6, 1959 -
January 28, 1959

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Incoming, 1959

Admiral W. H. Standley, 5 January 1957 to Mrs. H. A. Baldridge. Comments on Pearl Harbor investigation and his duty in Russia.

3 letters, May, June 1959, Rear Admiral J. L. Pratt, 14 June Pennsylvania magazine of history, 25 May. University of state of New York, 22 May. Discussing fraudulent historian Augustus Buell and the film of John Paul Jones!

Dear Rafe from Rear Admiral Thomas Robbins. Discussing Bates and Eccles discontinuing work at Naval War College.

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Letters Received, 1959

Two letters from Iceland Defense Force, Howard Cole,
January 1959. Discussing affairs in Iceland.

Letter from Harry Gimber (?), 21 January 1959
Enclosing clipping quoting Japanese Admiral Shima on
Battle at Leyte, particularly how false or misleading
action reports caused senior commanders receiving them to
make major errors.

CNO Admiral Burke, Dear Rafe, 23 January 1959
Congratulating him on his fine work in completing Vol. V
of Leyte work. Bates' work is a unique battle analyses.

Dear Rafe from Henry Eccles, 19 February 1959
Discussing book. Newport affairs and Ohio State Logistics
Conference and military theory.

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THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
(FLEET OPERATIONS AND READINESS)
WASHINGTON

6 January 1959

Dear Rafe:

Thanks for your last two letters. Don't be disturbed that I have any feeling that you were assailing Don Felt. I know how you feel about having to leave the battle studies program. I'll admit I have only been able to pick them up at odd times and go through them part way, but have really appreciated them. You are doing a fine job. I come up to the College for a lecture on the fourth of February. It is more or less a canned job and I am afraid I can't speak as much "off the cuff" on this subject as I would like to. I have found that I don't do so badly "off the cuff" when I am talking on something with which I am thoroughly familiar. Speaking on a particular subject such as this one, I find I do much better to stick fairly close to the text, keep it short and then take advantage of the question period to emphasize the points I want to make. If I keep the canned part short it gives more time for questions, and I believe I make more "hay" during that period. I appreciate your remarks and promise to do my best.

I had hoped to come up and stay overnight but I got tangled up with my old friends, Max and Leila Thornburg, for the night of the third so I will have to come right back after the luncheon on the fourth. I hope you will attend the luncheon and see that they have a martini for me beforehand.

Slim dropped in today. He looks good; in fact, much better than he did in Taiwan where he was bothered by eye trouble. He evidently had quite a session in Geneva.

Ruth keeps about the same - quite cheerful and has been entertaining quite a bit in our new quarters. She joins me in sending our best regards to you for a prosperous and healthy New Year.

Sincerely,

Rear Admiral R. W. Bates, USN (Ret).
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

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HEADQUARTERS
ICELAND DEFENSE FORCE

APO 81, NEW YORK, N. Y.

January 10th 1959

Dear Admiral,

Thank you for your Christmas letter. It was good to hear from you, particularly after I had demonstrated my own dilatory correspondence habits. I write principally to Jane then hit the job and the books the rest of the time. We work just short of six days a week because that's what it takes to get the job done. The days finish at about 1730 each evening and we work until one or two on Saturday. As I have indicated previously, the assignment has been thoroughly fascinating. I have learned and I have been able to make some sound recommendations. I work for a top-notch Air Force General. He is good, Admiral. Handles himself well. Graduate of several schools including the National War College. Strange, but except for the Commander, the Air Force is not too selective in sending its officers to this joint staff, while the Navy is just so-so. By contrast, the Army's policy is very strict in this regard. They select their officers for the most part very carefully. They require that the officers to the key billets be well trained and in line for higher command assignments. It's right in their selection criteria for joint staff assignments and we have some fine officers here **AS A RESULT.**

As I have said heretofore, the political ramifications of the Defense Force's presence here is clearly evident. Everything we do or say is conditioned by the possible political implications of our actions. As a result, great care must be taken before we do act. We suffer here by reason of lack of continuity on the job. With the assignments being for the greater part but for one year, the continuity problem becomes serious. The Icelandics are here all the time. Their tenure on the Defense Council-which is the liason group consisting of Icelandics and colonels or captains on the Defense Force that works out problems between Iceland and the Defense Force- works to their advantage. They are civil servants for the most part in the Foreign Ministry. Our people require months for indoctrination, arrive here woefully and inadequately prepared, the language barrier working against us and not them since they are poly-lingual-- to the end that our task is overly complicated by inexperience and sometimes ineptness. Of course this is not a-typical of all our foreign relations.

Right now the government has fallen and a caretaker government is holding the reins of power. One of the minority parties (Social Democrats) ~~are~~ in control with the tacit agreement from the Conservatives that a vote of no confidence will not be tolerated. The economy of the country is fantastically confused and complex. The wages are tied to the cost of living and much of the products (fish and agriculture products) are subsidized. Socialism is well imbedded in the economy. The Commies and Progressives rave and rant, the former in particular causing as much dissention and division as possible. We bear the brunt of much of the political maneuverings being fair game for all the parties; yet, because the economy is so dependent upon the assistance we provide they can't possibly boot us out. Our contribution is on the order of 15 million per year and amounts to a very large proportion of the hard currency income. The krona is so soft, it can't even be used for foreign exchange. Our grants-in-aid and loans have not had the desired effect-to keep the commies out of gov't and to stabilize the economy. Construction programs are the best means of providing

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**MISSING
PAGE(S)**

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GEORGE MURPHY
JUDGE

16 January 1959

Dear Admiral -

Under separate cover, I am sending you copy of Virginia Law Review, containing article about my brother Frank. I recall your estimation of Frank after he made a brief address at sea college. You were impressed by Frank's remark ~~concerning~~ concerning the "elasticity of mind" necessary for a Naval officer.

I am still a Reserve on Inactive Status. However, I received notice yesterday, I had to make request for active duty, retirement without pay or discharge. ~~While~~ I would like to remain on Inactive duty status a few years more, being ready, able and anxious to serve if needed. Now, however, I believe it best to request retirement status.

P.S. How is The "Reading Room"? Kind regards,
George Murphy

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1959

HEADQUARTERS
ICELAND DEFENSE FORCE
APO 81, NEW YORK, N. Y.

January 18th

Dear Admiral,

Just a note. In my last letter I had too much to say concerning a couple of fitness reports I received while working for Fuller Brush who now has the same job Dick Matter had. Not too long ago I told him how my opinion of myself and his opinion were quite unreconcilable. Aslo said his two fitness reports on me looked pretty incongruous alongside the remainder of the record. However, I told him quite emphatically I had no intention of asking him to change the reports since if this was his evaluation of me that was that.

In the meanwhile since coming to his new job he has looked over my record and has seen that it looks a little strange with his evaluation amongst the others. As a result it appears he's going to rectify the record becasue he asked me to send the necessary signed fitness reports (blanks). The part that bothers me is that there are a couple of others who may be similarly affected by his evaluation and I got just guts enough to not want to have mine changed if the other two or three remain unchanged. Of course a letter isn't a very good device to disclose all the variations on this theme so I won't ry. If I see you in February (if you're in Newport I will see you) I'll tell you as much as you want to know. What I was concerned about though was you. If this Captain had the temerity to consider changing the record, you may well have yourself. I can see you boiling down right in the middle of the Bureau of Personnel, saying to Brush, "Take care of my assistant Howard Cole, or I'll wrap a Bocci ball around your head". You could have done it, too. I know you believe this loyalty business doesn't work unless it works both ways. Well, don't do a thing if you do visit Washington. I believe it has worked itself out, and I should be able to write my ticket for my next job, as well.

Everything is still moving along well here. The political problems are mounting for a variety of reasons which I can't disclose in a letter. I've made a few recommendations and they're putting them into effect. You know you taught me not altogether new things but certain ones were deeply inculcated and I shan't forget them. IN particular when we went round and round on that B.U. course you insisted the professional training an officer should concentrate on when at the War College, and the effort he should direct toward increasing his brain power were of paramount importance. I see this in the professional attitude of many of the staff officers. "They don't take this assignment seriously enough. They fail to make up through application the deficiencies in their own background and education. They are not prepared to handle properly the sensitive issues that arise and as a result a few are overburdened rectifying in many instances the errors of others. An officer should be trained for this job, if he has one of the important ones. It is almost criminal not to adequately prepare every officer who is sent here to a key billet. He must have certain pre-requisite experience and he should have special training for this assignment. Here the political, sociological and economic aspects of the problems cannot be clearly discriminated from the purely military ones. We are poorly trained for these extra-military aspects of the job."

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One facet of our task is beyond our capacity to control. This is in regard to the enabling legislation that must come through congress as well as the enabling directives which must issue from State-Defense on much of what we're doing. Again to cite specifics I would have to go classified which I hesitate to do. I shall be happy to tell you of these matters also when we see each other. The fact remains that our phenomenally complex bureaucracy is doing two deadly things: a) it is stifling ideas and 2) it is slowing down to a desperate crawl-through the myriad checks- enabling actions. The interactions of the countless bureaus, agencies, departments and individuals has both a vitiating and harrasing effect that could well be our undoing. Enough.

Hope to see you shortly,

Howard

0875

1922 El Segundo Blvd
Gardena, Calif.

21 January, 1959

Dear Admiral,

Since we are in the midst of term exams and completing term projects, I shall take only a few minutes to jot down this note as a covering note for the enclosed material which I am forwarding for your use.

A recent issue of NEWSWEEK (12 January) carried on page 51 a short item entitled "The Admiral's Secret". I read it with great interest. I hope it has been called to your attention. Upon reading it I wrote to the LA Examiner and had them mail me a copy of the issue which carried the full text of Admiral Shima's letter -- it is that which I am forwarding.

I tried at the USC library today to get a photostat off this material, but they advised that they couldn't reproduce newspaper copy very well, so I am sending you the original clippings. When they have served their purpose, I would appreciate it if you would be kind enough to return the clippings to me.

According to the last word I had from Jack concerning your publishing schedule, your analysis of the Surigao Strait action was to have been completed by the first of the year, so this material may be coming too late to be of any real use in connection with that volume. On the other hand you may be able to insert a postscript.

As you see, I am sending this c/o of the College on the assumption that you are still in Newport and are still at work clearing up the last minute chores connected with completing a volume of the analyses.

With all good wishes for the new year, Fran joins me in sending our best regards.,

Your old shipmate,

Harry

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Admiral Shima Writes L. A. Boy

Japan War Mystery Solved!

Youth's Letter to Tokyo Brings Surprise Reply

By FRANK LEE DONOGHUE

Copyright, 1958, by The Los Angeles Examiner

A major mystery of World War II in the Pacific—the withdrawal of the Japanese second fleet at the height of the crucial Battle of Leyte Gulf in October, 1944—was solved yesterday through a Pacoima high school junior.

The solution came in a letter from Vice Admiral Kiyohide Shima, commander of the fleet, to 16-year-old Bill Frazer, Explorer Scout and amateur historian.

It was in reply to a request for help on a term paper Bill plans to submit next month to his teacher at San Fernando High.

Shima, who for more than 14 years has endured a storm of criticism from naval experts at home and abroad without offering an explanation of the move which contributed to the destruction of Japan's sea power, unburdened himself to the boy in what is certain to become one of the great historical documents of the War in the Pacific.

Boy Asked 2 Questions

Replying to young Frazer's queries—the boy asked two specific questions—the Nipponese admiral wrote in conclusion:

"It was quite clear that we should only fall into a ready trap . . . I considered all such things, events, circumstances, possibilities . . . I could not bear to sacrifice my destroyers alone."

Providing a background for his report to the American boy, Shima added grimly that the entire operation was to be a decisive one and a further defeat meant to Japan no longer incidental losses but the loss of life itself.

At the time of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, a running engagement through Surigao Strait involving the Japanese and Admiral Thomas Kinkaid's Seventh Fleet, American forces were fighting to the death against heavy odds on Leyte Island.

DISASTROUS—

A Japanese victory at sea would have cut off General MacArthur's liberation forces beginning their storming of Philippine beachheads.

EXCLUSIVE

United States forces took a heavy toll of the Japanese First Division Attack Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Nishimura. But then the Second Division Attack Force under Admiral Shima moved in for a strike early on the morning of October 24.

"At this point," said Bill yesterday, looking up from his maps of the Philippine Sea and his stack of reference books, "the American fighting strength was greatly reduced at the very time it was needed most to protect our amphibious shipping. New Japanese blows might have been disastrous to the whole campaign."



Los Angeles Examiner photo.

THERE HAD TO BE AN ANSWER FOR HIM
Bill Frazer went straight to the original source.

Dear Mr. Frazer,

I have received your letter of September 27, on October 21. I am deeply impressed by your spirit of study in the war history, and am glad to answer your question. It is happy for me to think if my explanations written on the attached papers would be useful for you.

Wishes for your health and success in the future.

Yours truly,

KIYOHIDE SHIMA
Vice Admiral, Japanese Navy

Copy of Adm. Shima's letter to Bill Frazer.

Admiral Shima Writes L. A. Boy

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Admiral Tells Why Japan Fleet Fled

NO ANSWER—

He had read that Shima had withdrawn, but he never found an explanation in any of the books he had studied during the past several months.

"I saw someplace that Vice Admiral Shima had steadfastly refused to discuss his part in the battle

and I wondered why," said Frazer. "I decided that I would find out, so I wrote to both sides in the battle: To the Navy Department at Washington, to Admiral Kinkaid and Admiral Halsey directly, to Imperial Naval Headquarters in Tokyo and to historians. In my letter to Tokyo, I enclosed a request to Admiral Shima, asking that it be forwarded."

The Japanese commander, mystery man among the defeated sea lords of his nation since the war, has been the only one to reply to the inquiries to date.

"This has been called the greatest naval engagement of all time and America's greatest sea victory in any war because so much depended on the outcome," Bill said. "I wanted all the facts, but I never thought Vice Admiral Shima would take the trouble to reply in such detail and with such frankness."

The young historian's parents, Charles and Margaret Frazer, said at their 13028 Kagel Canyon street home yesterday their son considered the letter from Shima as the "finest Christmas present he ever had."

Bill plans to join the Marine Corps after his graduation from high school and "rise from the ranks to become a career officer in military intelligence."

Following is the full text of Admiral Shima's letter.

Fourteen years have passed since the battle for Leyte Gulf was fought be-

tween the U. S. Fleet and ours, but I can even now assure you that my decisions and judgments of the day in Surigao Strait were adequate and proper. This assurance might sound rather radical for you, because some critics such as Mr. James Field Jr. are against me. I have never made any protest or any sort of things against such misunderstandings, for I believe that the truth would prove by itself in the long run of the history. But this time, I am deeply impressed by your eagerness and enthusiasm to find out the truth of the war in spite of your age. I will explain the truth which I myself encountered at that time in Surigao Strait.

I am afraid little information concerning actions of SHIMA Fleet during the battle are found in the U. S. and many reports on the battle were written neither with ample knowledge nor facts of actual features. It is very much to be regretted. The truth of the war should be understood through facts gathered from many sides and induced to a conclusion so as not to lose the balance of the day, in which the truth might rest. From those points of view, I will tell you about two of the most important problems which are to be confronted by students who wish to study Surigao Strait sea battle.

QUESTION 1. Why NISHIMURA and SHIMA Fleets, both of which then operated in the same area of Surigao Strait, with the same mission, were not put under one joint command?

ANSWER. Prior to our discussions on the mission of SHIMA Fleet, I will remind you the general situations of the war just before the SHO Operation had been activated. To understand this, I will quote from "The Campaign of the Pacific War" compiled by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey as follows:

"The steady advance of U. S. Forces across the Pacific had brought Japan, by early fall of 1944, to a position of grave peril. Kept continuously off balance by the timing and sequence of U. S. blows, dangerously weakened by attrition in important categories of weapons, the Japanese had been unable to back up their defensive perimeter with the planned fleet action and had been steadily forced back without being able to offer more than local resistance.

"Already the shipping losses inflicted by U. S. submarines and latterly by the carriers and shore-based air strikes were afflicting their economy and military machine with a creeping paralysis as the ties binding their homeland with the vital southern resources area became steadily more tenuous. The loss of the Marianas had been recognized by those in responsible position as a mortal blow, and any further advance to the westward would clearly end all hopes for success or even prolonged resistance.

"Despite the continuous attacks of United States submarines and air attacks, including aerial mining of China-based Army aircraft, a trickle of commerce still flowed behind the Philippine-Formosa-Ryukyu Is-

land screen, but this would last only as long as the screen was unpierced. The war had reached the point where a further defeat meant to the Japanese Empire no longer incidental losses but loss of life itself."

So were the situations, and Japanese Combined Fleet, still strong despite unbalance, had started all-out attacks against the oncoming U. S. forces. It was 10 October 1944. Task Force 38 struck Okinawa, and on the next day Luzon, and from 12 to 16, as their carrier planes swirled repeatedly over Formosa, the greatest air-sea battle between U. S. task force ships and Japanese shore-based aircraft occurred. Japanese sent to the spot more than 600 planes, the maximum available air strength to repel the U. S. fleet.

In spite of preliminary reports of great success, Japanese planes had in fact damaged only two cruisers, which showed the decline of Japanese air capabilities after struggles during three years of war. Their loss of the day amounted to more than 100. This preliminary exaggeration, however, cost Japan miserable miscalculation of Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet. He ordered SHIMA Fleet, the Second Diversion Attack Force, to pursue those alleged American cripples.

Primarily, according to the SHO Operation Plans, SHIMA Fleet consists of two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, four destroyers, was not assigned to attack Leyte Gulf via Surigao Strait, but flight with OZAWA Carrier Fleet, a famous decoy force, in an attempt to lure U. S. Carrier Task Force away from the scene of actions where KURITA battleship-heavy cruiser fleet to fight their way to Leyte beaches and destroy the invasion shipping.

Then came the ship-air duels of 12-16 October. SHIMA Fleet, by order of C-in-C, Combined Fleet, rushed to the scene, alleged U. S. cripples were limping. However, on its way to the scene, U. S. forces began landing at Leyte, and the situations became suddenly clear: U. S. Carrier Task Force, was not destroyed as previously claimed, and if SHIMA Fleet dared to continue running further south, they would be without doubt a mere prey of overwhelming enemy force. Immediately the order was cancelled, and made to change course toward Formosa Strait for a new mission of covering counter-landing forces which were said planned and prepared by Japanese Army force in Formosa.

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In the existing state of matters, I decided to request to C-in-C (Commander-in-Chief), Combined Fleet, that SHIMA Fleet to be added to the attacking forces for Leyte Gulf, as SHO Operation was a decisive one and a further defeat meant to Japan no longer incidental losses but loss of life itself. This request was finally approved. But the timing of the approval was when SHIMA Fleet had put to sea from a naval base in Formosa, and KURITA and NISHIMURA Fleets had left the Brunei Bay (Borneo) for Leyte and Surigao Straits respectively. I realized this mission of mine was quite new to other two fleets. I eagerly

wished to communicate with them. To communicate with them at sea, I should use wireless. But I could not use it because it would certainly unveil the presence of SHIMA Fleet to the enemy. This is but the common-sense of a Naval officer. Then, I made up my mind to maneuver in order to rendezvous with NISHIMURA Fleet in Leyte Gulf checking cleverly its own movements. In other words, I did not use wireless to put NISHIMURA Fleet under my own command in order to serve the real object of the Operation, that is, to attempt a surprise against the opponents with our superior concentration of force thrown into the area of action, the Leyte Gulf.

And there was one more reason not to be dropped. With NISHIMURA Fleet advancing against heavy odds, if I, as a newcomer, dared to make a change in a command system into a joint form at this tense moment, it would result not only in helpless unveiling of my positions and intentions, but also in miserable confusions of the battle between NISHIMURA Fleet and mine. I was most anxious of those. And those were the reasons why I did take any step to try nothing of plans to put the NISHIMURA Fleet under my command, Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet also did not. That shows, I believe, he was of the same opinion as I myself. Then there will be the next question.

QUESTION 2. Why SHIMA Fleet turned back just before dashing into Surigao Strait?

ANSWER. Flagship of SHIMA Fleet, heavy cruiser NACHI collided with heavy cruiser NOGAMI, just when the Fleet ran in the Strait. NACHI's bow was smashed and her maximum speed available reduced to as low as 20 knots. This made me unable to command my force leading at its top. That was the reason why I dropped off my initial intention. Then, why this collision ever happened at this critical moment? While dashing northward for Leyte into Surigao Strait, we observed an unidentified warship blazing up drifting on the pitchy dark sea. She looked like a bright lantern dead in the dark water. When we came up to the vicinity of the blazing ship with speed of 28 knots, our radar suddenly picked up groups of opponent ships at 9000 meters just ahead of us. I at once ordered torpedo attack. My judgement at that time was thus:

If we turned to starboard for launching torpedoes after we had passed by the burning ship, the opponents would be in a favorable position for marksmanship as we could be clearly silhouetted putting bright light in our back: we should turn in a foreground of the burning ship. The order

to put on helm to starboard was given. NACHI, at the top of the main body of my Fleet, turned sharply to the right, and began launching torpedoes one by one. However, the burning ship, NOGAMI, which we had estimated she was dead in water, was, in fact, moving slowly southward with her rudder out of action, and to our utmost surprise, she came rapidly near and near as NACHI circling to the right. Of course, NACHI immediately changed course to avoid collision, but it was too late. At the next instant, both ships collided in their bows at an angle of about 20 degrees.

With NACHI's bow smashed and her speed reduced to about 20 knots, how my decision should be at that moment? At that time, things flashed in my head were thus: The matter grew serious; NISHIMURA Fleet, consists of two battleships, one heavy cruiser and several lighter vessels ran into the Strait about half an hour before us were completely destroyed almost instantly; judging from this fact and others, the opponents must be a large concentration of battleships of the like, making full use of terrain and waiting us with all their might ready; the area of operation was dark and narrow hindering our free use of torpedo might; if we continued dashing further north, it was quite clear that we should only fall into a ready trap.

And another consideration must be paid for KURITA Fleet, with which I was to cooperate. KURITA Fleet was planned to dash into Leyte Gulf as a main fighting force, but I heard nothing from it about its movements ever since it had reversed its course after it had been forced to retreat in Sibuyan Sea. What happened to VADM KURITA? How many ships left in the Fleet? When could it arrive at Leyte beaches?

I considered all such things, events, circumstances, possibilities, etc. Then I came up to my decision that it would be better to retreat from the Strait and wait a chance to know how everything went. Four destroyers already been ordered to dash against the opponent were immediately called back. I could not bear to sacrifice my destroyers alone. Whole SHIMA Fleet, thus, turned back by order of myself to get out from Surigao Strait."

In the existing state of matters, I decided to request to C-in-C (Commander-in-Chief), Combined Fleet, that SHIMA Fleet to be added to the attacking forces for Leyte Gulf, as SHO Operation was a decisive one and a further defeat meant to Japan no longer incidental losses but loss of life itself. This request was finally approved. But the timing of the approval was when SHIMA Fleet had put to sea from a naval base in Formosa, and KURITA and NISHIMURA Fleets had left the Brunei Bay (Borneo) for Leyte and Surigao Straits respectively. I realized this mission of mine was quite new to other two fleets. I eagerly

wished to communicate with them. To communicate with them at sea, I should use wireless. But I could not use it because it would certainly unveil the presence of SHIMA Fleet to the enemy. This is but the common-sense of a Naval officer. Then, I made up my mind to maneuver in order to rendezvous with NISHIMURA Fleet in Leyte Gulf checking cleverly its own movements. In other words, I did not use wireless to put NISHIMURA Fleet under my own command in order to serve the real object of the Operation, that is, to attempt a surprise against the opponents with our superior concentration of force thrown into the area of action, the Leyte Gulf.

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CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

23 January 1959

Dear Rafe:

I understand that you have voluntarily spent the last six months completing Volume V of Leyte. In spite of obstacles that others and myself have had to throw in your way, you have carried on in a manner typical of your entire life of dedication to the Navy and to your country. I have found in this job that if somebody has a worthwhile idea and a willingness to work hard that his idea will come to the fore regardless of lack of funds or other discouraging factors.

The work you have done in your battle analyses is unique in the history of warfare. It will do much good and you are to be congratulated for a difficult job well done.

Warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

ARLEIGH BURKE

Rear Admiral R. W. Bates, USN(Ret)
12 Mt. Vernon Street
Newport, Rhode Island

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO

Op-29/dek

28 January 1959

Rear Admiral R. W. Bates, USN (Ret.)
Naval War College
Newport, Rhode Island

Dear Rafe:

Thank you for the copy of your good letter to Rollo, which I'm sure he will take to heart. As I told you, I got for him the carbon copy of your latest volume which he is now perusing.

You will be happy to know that both groups of material have arrived. I have put them in our classified archives segregated as "Bates - Leyte" collection to be kept as an annex of the files at the Naval War College. Thus they will be quickly available if needed.

If I hear anything down this way that looks favorable, I will send it to you by jet.

Best fortune to you always.

E. M. ELLER
Rear Admiral, USN (Ret.)
Director of Naval History

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BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Eric
De Reynolds
Oakland
John Adams

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